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Abstract
A multi-level model of opinion formation is presented
which takes into account that attitudes on different is-
sues are usually not independent. In the model, agents
exchange beliefs regarding a series of facts. A cogni-
tive structure of evaluative associations links different
(partially overlapping) sets of facts to different polit-
ical issues and determines an agents’ attitudinal posi-
tions in a way borrowed from expectancy value the-
ory. If agents preferentially interact with other agents
that hold similar attitudes on one or several issues, this
leads to biased argument pools and polarization in the
sense that groups of agents selectively belief in distinct
subsets of facts. Besides the emergence of a bi-modal
distribution of opinions on single issues that most pre-
vious opinion polarization models address, our model
also accounts for the alignment of attitudes across sev-
eral issues along ideological dimensions.
1 Introduction
Modeling the dynamics of political opinions is a
complicated issue. It is the interplay of a manifold
of psychological and social processes that leads
to the formation of complex landscapes of polit-
ical preferences. Many different theoretical pieces
must be brought together for an encompassing un-
derstanding of political opinion dynamics and a
single article like this can only address a few of
them.
A particular focus of this article is on the multi-
level structure of political opinion spaces. On the
one hand side, we distinguish arguments and be-
liefs about facts from a political issue on which an
attitude is formed by considering that a whole se-
ries of facts speaking in favor or in disfavor of a
certain position is usually involved in an attitu-
dinal judgement. In line with expectency-value
theories of attitude research and measurement
(Fishbein and Raven, 1962; Fishbein, 1963; Ajzen,
2001), we assume that an attitude regarding a po-
litical issue is formed through a structure of evalu-
ations regarding the different aspects that are rel-
evant for the topic. Also communication about
those topics makes reference to these underlying
argumentative dimensions. On the other hand, we
present a model in which different political issues
may be discussed at the same time. These topics
are not independent but related through the un-
derlying cognitive-evaluative meaning structures.
Depending on the nature of the relations in these
evaluative schemata, different patterns of politi-
cal preferences evolve that lend to an organization
along politico-ideological dimensions such as left
versus right or liberal versus conservative.
The model proposed in this paper is an exten-
sion of the »argument communication theory of
bi-polarization (ACTB)« that has been proposed
in Mäs and Flache (2013). The ACTB attempts
to explain the emergence of a bi-modal opinion
distribution in the sense that small initial opin-
ion differences are amplified in processes of social
influence so that two antagonistic groups cover-
ing the extremes of an opinion spectrum emerge.
The argument-based approach by Mäs and Flache
(2013) combines ideas from persuasive argument
theory of group polarization (Burnstein and Vi-
nokur, 1975, 1977; Isenberg, 1986) with the as-
sumption that homophily with respect to the opin-
ions (McPherson et al., 2001; Wimmer and Lewis,
2010; Bakshy et al., 2015) guides interaction and
communication behavior. Opinions are based on
a series of pro- and con-arguments that are ex-
changed in an interaction process. Homophily
creates a tendency that actors interact with like-
minded others and therefore are likely to be ex-
posed to arguments that further support their
current attitudinal inclination. Analogous to the
»law of group polarization« described in Sunstein
(2002), this leads to biased argument pools that
may reinforce group opinions in the direction of
an initial inclination. Apart from the social bias
of homophily no further psychological distortions
are needed to explain the emergence of a bi-polar
opinion distribution.
ATCB as well as quite a series of other recent po-
larization models focus on the formation of a bi-
modal opinion distribution. However, such strong
patterns of opinion divergence with respect to sin-
gle issues cover only one aspect of polarization
(DiMaggio et al., 1996; Bramson et al., 2016).
Moreover, it has been empirically found only for
certain morally charged, »polarizing« topics such
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as abortion in US public opinion (DiMaggio et al.,
1996). Besides different forms of social polar-
ization such as, for instance, increasingly antag-
onistic references between two groups of different
identity (Uitermark et al., 2016; Mason, 2018),
also further more specific notions of issue po-
larization have been put forth (DiMaggio et al.,
1996). The sorting of opinions regarding diverse
sets of political goals along ideological dimensions
as recently identified in opinion data on American
public opinion (Dimock et al., 2014) is of partic-
ular relevance in our context. In fact, an organi-
zation of the complex landscapes of political pref-
erences along a few axes such as left versus right,
liberal versus conservative or technocratic versus
ecological (Leuthold et al., 2007) can only acquire
meaning if political preferences regarding a multi-
tude of political goals are correlated over a popu-
lation and constraint in form of a belief system or
ideology (Converse, 1964).
The main aim of the paper is to show that ACTB
is easily extended to account for this kind of
opinion sorting or ideological alignment as well.
We think that this contributes to a better un-
derstanding of the formation of complex but at
the same time specifically organized opinion land-
scapes. For this purpose we assume the exis-
tence of cognitive-evaluative maps which encode
the evaluative meaning of different beliefs with re-
spect to the different issues of discussion. To sim-
plify the interpretation of the dynamical behavior
of the model, we consider that these evaluation
structures have been acquired in the same socio-
cultural context and are collectively shared by all
agents. This can be seen as a way to incorpo-
rate some notion of cultural meaning (Berger and
Luckmann, 1970; Schütz and Luckmann, 2017)
into models of opinion dynamics, and we will dis-
cuss the possibility that different »cultures« with
their specific evaluative schemata engage in an ar-
gument exchange process and relate this to recent
approaches to infer shared belief systems from at-
titudinal data (Baldassarri and Goldberg, 2014;
Daenekindt et al., 2017). Our structure is in-
spired by structural theories of attitudes (Fishbein
and Raven, 1962; Fishbein, 1963; Ajzen, 2001) in
which a systematic distinction between beliefs and
evaluations is made. In our model we consider the
evaluations as externally given and model the ex-
change of arguments about a set of beliefs that are
relevant in the thematic complex at question. As
the same beliefs may contribute positively or neg-
atively to different issues, the evaluative structure
already imposes constraints on the admissible po-
sitions in the opinion space. Only certain combi-
nations of opinions are possible and the argument
exchange process of the ACTB can inform us about
the likeliness of specific configurations especially
in conditions of polarization.
The paper is organized as follows. We first intro-
duce the model (Sec. 2). In Section 3 we analyze
its basic behavior by looking at 12 cases differing
in the type of evaluative structure and homophily
mechanism in the case of two issues. Two cases
are explored with some more detail in this section.
We then (in Sec. 4) look at an example with three
issues that illustrates how meaningful arguments
can in principle be integrated into the structure.
We discuss the model from a broader perspective
in Sec. 5 and draw a conclusion on this paper in
Sec. 6.
2 The Model
We model a population of agents that exchange
arguments about different political issues. Our
model is based on three different ingredients: (1)
agents exchange their beliefs regarding a series of
facts; (2) different (partially overlapping) sets of
facts are associated with different political issues
and an agent’s attitude towards these issues is a
function of the evaluative relevance of the facts
for the different issues; and (3) agents preferen-
tially interact with other agents that hold simi-
lar attitudes on the issues. These combined pro-
cesses give rise to polarization and »constraint[s]
or functional interdependenc[ies]« (cf. (Converse,
1964, 3)) in the configuration of attitudes towards
multiple political issues.
Argument Strings. Consider a population of N
agents that exchange arguments about different
political issues. There are NA argument dimen-
sions related to facts which an agent (say s) either
believes to be true ask = 1 or not ask = 0. That is,
each agent holds a binary string ~as ∈ {0, 1}NA rep-
resenting her current believes in a number of facts.
As a convention, we shall index the argument di-
mensions by k (1 ≤ k ≤ NA) and the agents by s
and r for sender and receiver (1 ≤ s, r ≤ N). Con-
sequently, the argument strings of the entire popu-
lation can be represented by anN×NA matrixA in
which single rows represent the argument strings
of the agents and the element ask denotes the be-
lief of agent s with respect to the kth factual di-
mension.
Evaluative Structure. We consider that opinions
are multi-level constructs. Agents hold beliefs re-
garding a series of factual dimensions (encoded
in A) and opinions on the set of issues are deter-
mined by specific configurations of beliefs. One of
the main assumptions of this work is that the link
from beliefs to attitudes is realized by a cognitive-
evaluative map that encodes how different fac-
tual dimensions contribute to an attitudinal judge-
ment. This map is modeled as a bi-partite graph
(I,A, C) which represents the relation between a
set of issues I and the set of argumentative di-
mensions A related to facts. We denote the car-
dinality of these two sets as NI and NA respec-
tively. The NA × NI evaluation matrix C assigns
values cki ∈ [−1, 1] to the set C of associations
which represent (i.) whether an attitude object
i (a political issue in our case) is positively or neg-
atively evaluated if a certain fact k is believed to
be true (signcki), and (ii.) the extend to which
that fact k contributes to the evaluation of i (|cki|).
This structure is inspired by the expectancy value
model of attitudes following Fishbein and Raven
(1962); Fishbein (1963) and one may think of the
set of factual beliefs as beliefs on the presence or
absence of attributes.
In the computation of the evaluative judgement –
that is, the attitude – regarding the different is-
sues, we follow the algebraic model of expectancy
value theory in a straightforward manner. Namely,
the single argument-evaluation contributions are
additively combined in the determination of the
valence (degree of favor/disfavor) assigned the is-
sue i:
os(i) =
NA∑
k=1
askcki. (1)
Consequently, the attitudes on a whole set of NI
issues for a single agent s are given by the scalar
product os = ~as · C. For the entire population we
can then write in matrix form
O = A · C. (2)
The element osi = os(i) in the resultingN×NI ma-
trix O represents the attitude or opinion of agent
s towards issue i.
Generally, the evaluative structure C may vary
across individuals and every individual s could
be represented by its own structure Cs. This
would allow for inter-individual differences re-
garding the understanding and relevance for eval-
uation of different properties. Furthermore, while
we model an exchange of arguments and assume
that agents understand them equally, political dis-
course is actually often about the meaning of con-
cepts involved in argumentative statement. That
is, attitude change may actually often come about
by changes in the perception, evaluative mean-
ing and relevance of arguments. We shall discuss
both issues in Section 5. As explained in the In-
troduction, in most parts of this paper, we assume
a shared and time-homogeneous evaluative struc-
ture Cs = C for all agents which is motivated by
the fact that individuals within the same socio-
cultural context have internalized similar evalu-
ative maps. We show that attitudes may polarize
along ideologically coherent lines even if agents
interpret facts in the same way because groups of
agents selectively belief in distinct subsets of facts.
Argument exchange. We assume a very sim-
ple mechanism for the argument exchange pro-
cess. At each time step, agents are paired ran-
domly and one agent, the sender s, articulates
a randomly chosen argument k (that is, her be-
lief that fact k is true or not). The other agent
r receives that argument and adopts the respec-
tive belief, i.e. ark = ask. With this simple pro-
cedure we follow previous approaches in opinion
dynamics modeling with multidimensional opin-
ions (Axelrod, 1997; Banisch et al., 2010) and de-
part slightly from the more complex implementa-
tion in Mäs and Flache (2013) where the activa-
tion of one argument entails the deactivation of
another. The argument exchange mechanism is
visually summarized in Fig. 1
Bounded Confidence and Biased Argument
Pools. Notice that in the argument exchange pro-
cess imlemented in the ACTB (Mäs and Flache,
2013) as well our implementation no forms of bi-
ased argument processing are integrated. While
the integration of such biases could be an inter-
esting extension of the models, it is not needed to
explain the emergence of bi-polar opinion distri-
butions and the inter-attitudinal constraints that
we address in this paper. An »homophily bias«
which creates a tendency that actors interact with
like-minded others is sufficient.
In our case, homophily is assumed to play out at
the level of attitudes towards the NI issues and
not on the level of the underlying arguments. Be-
sides ACTB (Mäs and Flache, 2013), this idea has
another important predecessors in the biological
model of sympatric speciation developed by Kon-
drashov (1986); Kondrashov and Shpak (1998).
In this model, a population of binary strings is
assumed to represent the genomic diversity of a
0 0 11 1 0
0 0 01 1 0
Person A
Person B
+20
0 +1
A articulates a randomly
chosen argument
0 0 11 1 0
0 0 11 1 0
Person A
Person B
+20
0 +1
B adopts that argument if
attitudes are similar enough
0 0 11 1 0
0 0 11 1 0
Person A
Person B
+20
0 +2
is leads to an attitude
change for B
Figure 1: Summary of the argument exchange process.
species and the phenotype is a function on these
strings which maps gen strings with the same
number of ones to the same phenotype (i.e. a
genotype-phenotype mapping using the Hamming
weight). In our notation, such a mapping of a
genotype in form of a binary string to a single phe-
netic trait is obtained by setting C = (1, . . . , 1)T in
Eq. (2). Homophily (which is more often called
assortativity in the biological context) acts on the
phenotype level such that individuals with oppo-
site phenotypes cannot mate. This leads to re-
productively isolated gene pools and hence to the
splitting of species. In a very similar way, ho-
mophily constraints at the attitude level lead to
biased argument pools in a sense closely related
to Sunstein (2002).
There are different ways to integrate homophily
assumptions into such models. While a thresh-
old mechanism is used in Kondrashov and Shpak
(1998), a frequency-dependent interaction proba-
bility that takes into account the relative similar-
ity of opinions with respect the entire popuation
is used in Mäs and Flache (2013). In this work we
rely on the concept of bounded confidence which
has been introduced in opinion dynamics models
(Deffuant et al., 2000; Hegselmann et al., 2002)
as a simple mechanism for opinion homophily ac-
counting for the well-established observation that
people are more likely to interact if they hold sim-
ilar views (McPherson et al., 2001). Bounded con-
fidence realizes this by a threshold β on the opin-
ion distance between two agents s and r such
that no interaction takes place if d(os, or) > β
where d(. , . ) denotes some distance measure on
the space of opinions which depends on the re-
spective opinion structure.
Noteworthy, in a model aimed at describing the
evolution of attitudes on various issues, several
options become available. For instance, it might
be that positions on one issue are much more
salient with respect to the decision of whether
or not to engage in communication with another
agent1. In this case, we take into account only
the positions on this issue in the distance compu-
tation. It might also be an asymmetric relation.
Furthermore, even the situation that a single ar-
gument signals an unacceptable stance of the in-
terlocutor might be plausible in some cases. We
will explore some of these options and provide an
overview of their impact in the next Section.
3 Results: Two Issues
3.1 Simulation Settings
In this section we provide a general overview of
the model behavior for the case of two issues. All
the results are based on simulations with N =
1000 agents. In all the cases we consider that 6
factual dimensions are relevant for each of the is-
sues and that three of them contribute positively
with cki = 1 and three negatively with cki = −1
to the respective attitude. Following Eq. (2), this
means that the attitudinal judgements range from
-3 (extreme disfavor) to +3 (extreme favor) and
are neutral oi = 0 if all facts are believed. But we
look at three different conditions concerning the
evaluative overlap with respect to the two issues:
1. the two issues are independent and there are
6 arguments relevant to the first and 6 other
arguments relevant to the second issue,
1The case that assortativity depends on only one phenetic
trait and thus a subset of genes has been studied in Kon-
drashov and Shpak (1998).
2. the two issues are weakly compatible in terms
of the evaluative structure such that 2 factual
dimensions contribute equally (one positively
and one negatively) to the evaluation of the
issues,
3. the two issues are strongly incompatible by
assuming that 2 arguments contribute posi-
tively to the first and negatively to the second
issue and another 2 arguments contribute
negatively to the first and positively to the
second.
The respective bi-partite graphs are shown in Fig.
2. Notice that there are 12 arguments in the first
but only 8 in the last condition. We have chosen
this setup to make sure that the range of opinions
is equal (from -3 to +3) in all the three conditions.
two
independent
issues 
two weakly and
congruently related
issues 
two strongly and
incongruently related
issues 
Figure 2: Three different evaluative maps are used
that differ in the strength and congruency of the
evaluative overlap. Solid lines indicate positive
links and dashed line negative associations.
Furthermore, we analyze the effect of four dif-
ferent homophily mechanisms by considering four
different measures of distance upon which agents
are assumed to judge whether or not they engage
in effective communication with one another:
1. the Manhattan distance d(os, or) = |os(1) −
or(1)|+ |os(2)− or(2)| taking into account the
two issues,
2. the Euclidean distance d(os, or) =√
(os(1)− or(1))2 + (os(2)− or(2))2 that
takes into account both issues as well,
3. the distance (or opinion difference) with re-
spect to one issue i∗, d(os, or) = |os(i∗) −
or(i
∗)|,
4. and the difference with respect to a single be-
lief k∗, d(os, or) = |ask∗ − ark∗|.
A summary of the 12 different combinations of ho-
mophily conditions and the three different evalua-
tive structures is provided Fig. 9 (see Section ??).
In all the simulations we consider throughout this
paper, the population is initialized with random
binary argument strings. This means that for
each argument independently there is a fifty-fifty
chance to be believe ak = 1 in the beginning. Con-
sequently, after projection onto the attitude scale
by C, the initial distribution of attitudes with re-
spect to the two issues is a binomial distribution
with zero mean. Depending on the evaluative
structure and the evaluative overlap in particu-
lar the initial attitudes on the two issues are al-
ready correlated. As shown in the next section,
this initial correlation is enforced in the argument
exchange process especially under conditions of
polarization.
3.2 Two Strongly Coupled Issues
To illustrate the dynamical behavior of the argu-
ment exchange model we first concentrate on a
specific combination that highlights the two prop-
erties in the distribution of opinions our paper
aims to address. Therefore, we consider the case
of two issues that are strongly interrelated in an
incongruent way. The respective evaluative struc-
ture is shown on the bottom of Fig. 2. There are
4 argument dimensions that are relevant for both
issues. Two of those assign a positive weight to
the first ck1 = 1 and a negative weight to the sec-
ond issue ck2 = −1 and for the other two it is the
other way around. This means that if one of these
facts is believed ask = 1 by an agent s it will have a
positive impact regarding its attitude on one and
a negative impact on the evaluation of the other
issue. With respect to homophily we assume in
this section that the first issue »polarizes« meaning
that agent with different opinions regarding the
first issue are less likely to interact. The second
issues plays no role in that. The bounded confi-
dence threshold β is used to modulate the strength
of homophily with respect to the first issue.
Fig. 3 shows the distribution of opinions on the
two issues at different times of the process start-
ing with the initial distribution on the upper left.
As noted above, the random initialization of ar-
guments leads to a binomial initial distribution
of opinions for each of the issues. The extremes
Issue 1 Issue 1 Issue 1Issue 2 Issue 2 Issue 2
Issue 1 Issue 1 Issue 1Issue 2 Issue 2 Issue 2
Time = 0 Time = 100 Time = 200
Time = 300 Time = 500 Time = 1000
Figure 3: Attitude distribution of 1000 agents in the two-dimensional attitude space during different
times of the process. (β = 1)
of the opinion spectrum are only rarely popu-
lated. The strong incongruent overlap encoded
in the evaluative structure in this setting already
induces a negative correlation between the ini-
tial opinions on both issues. Already after 100
steps this correlation pattern becomes consider-
ably more pronounced, the spread of the distri-
bution increases and the extremes become pop-
ulated. Note that after this relatively short time
the most extreme opinions on issue 1 (homophily-
relevant) are adopted by the majority of agents
but that also the second issue is polarized, al-
beit not that strongly. This strong pattern of
bi-polarization is accentuated during subsequent
steps of the simulation and agents with interme-
diate attitudes become very rare. The strong neg-
ative coupling between the issues constrains the
two different opinion groups to specific combina-
tions of attitudes. The two groups develop oppos-
ing views not only with respect to the »polarizing«
first issue but also with respect to the second one.
An example for such a setting might be two policy
proposals that are discussed as competing alterna-
tive solution to the same problem. If one believes
in coal as the future technology for electric power
production and supports public investments into
that area one probably disfavors subventions in re-
newable energy production technology. Of course,
our model provides only very stylized representa-
tions of such complex issues but it reveals a possi-
ble logic behind the formation of certain constel-
lations of attitudes. It also shows how two groups
that develop opposing attitudes tend to selectively
believe and adopt facts that support their respec-
tive views if their interaction behavior is guided
by their current attitudinal stance deciding about
interlocutors whose arguments can be taken seri-
ously.
In our model, the bounded confidence threshold
β decides about the strength of this social inter-
action bias. For the given setting, Fig. 4 shows
the opinion distributions after 1000 iterations for
β ranging from zero to three (left to right). Notice
that β = 0 indicates that only agents with exactly
the same opinion on issue 1 engage into the ar-
gument exchange process. Likewise, for β = 2
agents that are differ at most 2 points on the 7
item attitude scale from extreme disfavor to ex-
treme favor interact. This means, for instance,
that a neutral agent will interact with strong sup-
porters but not with extreme ones and that agents
that weakly favor one option will still interact with
agents who weakly disfavor it. As Fig. 4 shows,
a polarization pattern emerges up to this case of
β = 2. If the threshold increases, homophily is not
strong enough to lead to opinion bi-polarization.
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Figure 4: Attitude distribution of 1000 agents after 1000 iterations in the two-dimensional attitude
space for different values of the bounded confidence threshold (β = 0, 1, 2, 3). The pattern of ideologi-
cal coherent polarization is stable for a wide set of β.
3.3 Two weakly congruent issues
Let us consider another example slightly more
carefully and look at the case of two weakly cou-
pled issue as shown in the middle in Fig. 2. The
overlap in the evaluative structure indicates that a
slightly positive relation between the opinions will
result from such interdependencies. In terms of
homophily, we consider now the Manhattan dis-
tance in the two-dimensional opinion space and
assume that argument exchange takes place only
if the |os(1)−or(1)|+ |os(2)−or(2)| < β. The opin-
ion distribution after 1000 iterations is shown in
Fig. 5 for β ranging from zero to five.
We observe two interesting transitions in this case.
First, if β is small (here if β ≤ 2), distributions
emerge in which the neutral positions on the two
issues are more and more sparsely occupied. Es-
pecially the case of β = 1 shows that there may be
several highly populated configurations of opin-
ions arranged elliptically around the center. This
means that despite the positive coupling of the
two issues, groups of agents may adopt a nega-
tive stance on one and a positive opinion on the
other issue. As shown in the last row of Fig. 9
the shape of this depends on the strength of the
evaluative overlap between the two issues.
As the bounded confidence threshold increases be-
yond β = 2 a different pattern emerges which is
more closely related to a typical bi-polarized opin-
ion distribution. Two groups emerge that develop
consistently opposing standpoints on the two is-
sues with negative or positive opinions regarding
both issues. Notice that for β = 4 the distribution
along this negative/negative to positive/positive
dimension is almost flat and intermediate neutral
opinions are still present after 1000 iterations. In
this case, bi-polarization along the diagonal is a
transient phenomena. This is shown in Fig. 6
where the time evolution of the opinion distribu-
tion is considered. Although a clear pattern of bi-
polarization is visible after 500 steps, intermedi-
ate moderate opinions can be sustained in this pa-
rameter setting. These intermediate agents help
to maintain a »flow of arguments« between the
two groups which circumvent the emergence of
isolated argument pools that would lead to group
polarization. As a result of this persistent expo-
sure to diverse arguments, agents with extreme
opinions become more moderate again in the long
run and the whole population converges on mod-
erate positions.
3.4 Summary of the model behavior
In Fig. 9, an overview of the model behavior in
the different settings described in Sec. 3.1 is pro-
vided. Here we show the distribution of opinions
after 1000 iteration for a relatively small β = 1.
The three columns of this figure correspond to the
three different evaluative maps shown in Fig. 2.
In the first row the two issues are completely in-
dependent, in the second column the issues are
weakly interrelated as in the previous section, and
the third column represents the strongly coupled
case considered in Sec. 3.2.
The rows correspond to four different ways to take
into account opinion homophily. In the first row,
we consider the case that two agent engage in
the argument exchange process only if their be-
lief regarding a single fact (k = 5 in this case) is
equal. The idea behind this is that a single be-
lief may signal an unacceptable stance of the in-
terlocutor (such as, for instance, neglecting that
CO2 emissions cause global warming). However,
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Figure 5: Attitude distribution of 1000 agents af-
ter 1000 iterations in the two-dimensional atti-
tude space for different values of the bounded
confidence threshold (β = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5). The
Manhattan distance is used in the homophily
mechanism.
under the argument exchange dynamics incorpo-
rated into our model, this is generally not suffi-
cient for polarization to emerge. The second row
considers the homophily mechanisms studied in
Sec. 3.2. As expected, a strong pattern of bi-
polarization with respect to the »polarizing« is-
sue emerges. The strength of interrelatedness of
the two issues encoded in the cognitive-evaluative
map governs to what extend the other issues (is-
sue 2 in this case) polarizes »along with« the first
issue. The last two rows correspond to two differ-
ent distance measures that take into account the
agents’ positions on both issues. In the third row
the Euclidean distance is used and in the forth
one the Manhattan distance. The figure shows
that the behavior in terms of the distribution of
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Figure 6: Time evolution of the attitude distri-
bution for β = 4. The persistence of intermedi-
ate opinions resolves the short-term polarization
in the long run.
opinions is very similar. The arrangement of ad-
missible opinions around the center shows that
certain opinion configurations are impossible due
to the evaluative structure. Namely, under weak
congruent coupling an extremely positive stance
on one issues implies that an extremely negative
stance with respect to the other is not admissible.
These constraints imposed by the evaluative map
are even more substantial under strong coupling
where the upper right and the lower left corner of
the opinion space cannot be occupied.
The main purpose of this section has been to high-
light two essential properties of the argument ex-
change model when extended to multiple issues.
For this purpose, we have concentrated on a set
of stylized settings. We have shown that the bi-
polarizing dynamics of the ACTB (Mäs and Flache,
2013) is recovered by our version. By showing
that the polarization with respect to one issue may
force agents to take a specific viewpoint on an-
other issue if they are cognitively related we pro-
vide a possible explanation of a further important
aspect of opinion polarization: the alignment of
opinions across different issues within the two op-
posing groups of agents.
4 An example with three issues
The actual objective of the model presented
throughout this paper is to work towards a frame-
work that allows to connect opinion dynamics
modeling to real data on political statements and
opinions. The evaluative structure is compatible
with structural expectancy-value models of atti-
tudes (Fishbein and Raven, 1962; Fishbein, 1963;
Ajzen, 2001) that are still widely used in survey-
based attitude research. We will exploit this po-
tential in the future but shall conclude this paper
with a stylized example of some empirical plausi-
bility.
Nuclear
Power Coal
Renewable
Energy
4. natural resources
are nite
5. CO2 is the main
cause of global warming
1. our economies
require stable
energy supply
2. Fukushima may
happen here
3. wind parks and
solar eld destroy
our enviromnent
Figure 7: An example with five factual dimensions
and three issues. The structure is highly constraint
as all arguments are negatively (dashed) or posi-
tively (solid) related to all the three issues.
We consider a population of agents that debates
on three different technologies for electric power
production: nuclear power (i1), coal (i2) and tech-
nologies based on renewable sources (i3). We al-
low only five arguments that are related by differ-
ent degrees to economic stability (k1, k4), security
(k2) and sustainability (k3, k4, k5):
k1 »The growing economies of the world need
reliable and scalable energy sources.«
k2 »An accident like in Fukushima may happen
here.«
k3 »Large wind parks and vast solar fields impair
the appearance of our environment.«
k4 »Natural resources are finite.«
k5 »Human-made CO2 emissions are the main
cause of global warming.«
The choice of some of these statements has been
inspired by the debates on the web page Pro-
Con.org.2 As shown in Fig. 7, all the arguments
are linked to all the issues as they are most often
used as pro- or con-arguments for one technology
against others. Notice that the arguments have
been chosen with some care so that each issue has
two negative and three positive connections.
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Figure 8: Result of a realization of the model with
the evaluative structure shown in Fig. 7. Three
groups emerge in the argument exchange process.
One (blue, 471 agents) strongly supports renew-
able energy opposing coal and nuclear power. A
second one (yellow, 359 agents) strongly supports
nuclear power but is also slightly positive with re-
spect to coal. A third group (green, 170 agents)
favors coal and is neutral with respect to nuclear
power and renewables.
We run this model using the Manhattan distance
in the homophily condition and with β = 3. Fig.
8 shows the opinion configurations after 20000
steps. In this case, the population has converged
and further argument exchange is possible due to
the bounded confidence threshold. In this sim-
ulation three different groups emerge. The first
one with almost one half of the population (471
agents) develops an opinion that is extremely sup-
portive of renewable energy technology (+3) and
has a negative opinion regarding the other two (-
1). The string of beliefs of this group is (01011),
that is, they belief only in those three arguments
that are positively related to renewable energy.
The second group of 359 agents strongly support
2https://alternativeenergy.procon.org in particular.
nuclear power (+3) while downgrading renew-
ables (-1) but not coal (1). The associated be-
lief string of this subpopulation is (10101). A third
smaller group of agents (170) supports coal (+2)
while being neutral (0) with respect to the other
two technologies. The beliefs in this group have
settled on (11000).
Although we will discuss implications and limi-
tations of the model in the next section, a short
comment on the significance of this example shall
be made here. We do certainly not want to claim
that this restricted argument set is suited to accu-
rately represent the real debate around those is-
sues. But the example is informative about how
our argument exchange model can be applied and
what kind of results we can expect if real argu-
ment data is fed into it. Very often the intertwin-
ing of different arguments about different issues
is rather hard to disentangle and its consequences
for deliberative communication are unclear. The
proposed model can improve our understanding
how underlying structures (of beliefs, of argumen-
tation, of evaluative connotations) affect debates
like the one caricatured here. For instance, further
simulations have revealed that the emergence of a
blue group (strong renewable supporters) is very
robust and that the distance in attitude space be-
tween this group and the supporters of the two
other technologies is generally larger than the dis-
tance between these other two. The reason for
this is an asymmetry in the evaluative structure
(Fig. 7) in which the argument 4 (»natural re-
sources are finite«) is the only one which con-
tributes negatively to two of the issues (namely,
coal and nuclear power).
5 Discussion
With this paper, we contribute to a relatively new
development to introduce a cognitive level into
models of opinion dynamics. While most pre-
vious models operate on rather abstract opinion
spaces ranging from binary states (Sznajd-Weron
and Sznajd, 2000; Galam, 2005; Banisch, 2014)
to multi-dimensional (Axelrod, 1997; Baldassarri
and Bearman, 2007; Banisch et al., 2010) and
continuous state spaces (Deffuant et al., 2000;
Hegselmann et al., 2002)3, the incorporation of
belief systems (Friedkin et al., 2016; Parsegov
3See (Castellano et al., 2009; Flache et al., 2017) for
more encompassing overviews.
et al., 2016), structural representations of atti-
tudes (Urbig and Malitz, 2005; Mäs and Flache,
2013) and cognitive networks (Van Overwalle and
Heylighen, 2006; Wolf et al., 2012, 2015) is a
relatively new development (see also Conte and
Paolucci, 2014). By allowing to integrate some-
times very specific information (see esp. Wolf
et al., 2015) on the issues addressed by the model,
this is a promising development to answer the
fundamental critique that opinion dynamics lacks
links to real data (Sobkowicz, 2009), see also
(Flache et al., 2017). Based on the previous model
by Mäs and Flache (2013), we present a model-
ing framework for opinion dynamics on multiple
cognitively related issues which is rich enough to
incorporate some aspects of the conceptual struc-
ture underlying a real debate.
We illustrate this potential by the example stud-
ied in the last section, but the main focus of this
paper has been to understand the basic proper-
ties of such a model. The model is already com-
plex and involves quite a number of parameters
and design choices, most importantly: the param-
eterization of the evaluative structure and the con-
ceptual overlap and different forms of homophily
at the attitude level. It is important to under-
stand the impact of these modeling choices before
the model can be used in more applied scenar-
ios. We have followed a computational approach
here by systematically analyzing 12 combinations
of 4 homophily modes and 3 paradigmatic evalu-
ative structures, but also analytical strategies de-
veloped in theoretical biology can be applied to
simple cases (Banisch et al., forthcoming).
Most sociologist agree that one should include
psychological complexity into models address-
ing social aggregations and collective phenomena
only to the extend that they substantially con-
tribute to the explanation of the phenomenon at
stake (Lindenberg, 1992; Kron, 2004; Kroneberg,
2005). On the one hand side, we follow this tra-
dition by developing a very simple model of argu-
ment communication that simplifies the original
model of ACTB by Mäs and Flache (2013) in two
regards. Namely, we assume a process of argu-
ment exchange in which beliefs are directly trans-
mitted from a sender to a receiver (»copied«) and
we simplify the homophily mechanism by rely-
ing on the concept of bounded confidence. While
the psychological precision of these assumptions
at the inter-individual level can be disputed (and
sometimes is, Mueller and Tan, 2018) our results
show that, at the aggregate level, the essential dy-
namical properties of ACTB are preserved under
the parsimonious design choices made here. In
another regard, we take a step towards a more
complex model by focusing on different cognitive-
evaluative maps that link beliefs to attitudes. This
generates a considerable degree of freedom in our
model and, in fact, would lead to a combinato-
rial explosion of the number of free parameters if
these structures were purely individual.
However, in our case we consider that these eval-
uation structures have been acquired in the same
socio-cultural context and are collectively shared
by all agents. While from the methodological
point of view this simply reduces the number of
parameters and makes systematic computational
analysis possible, there is also a tradition in Sociol-
ogy to view culture as shared meaning structures
(Berger and Luckmann, 1970; Schütz and Luck-
mann, 2017) and their integration in form of cog-
nitive networks seems a viable approach (cf. Kro-
neberg, 2005, 359, and see also Strauss and Quinn
(1997)). Understood in this way, as »ideal-typical«
cognitive representations of evaluative meaning
acquired in long processes of socialization, these
structures become very relevant to the analysis of
public opinion formation and are, in our model,
essential for the explanation of issue alignment.
Furthermore, the model entails the possibility to
consider different sub-population or sub-cultures
with differing cognitive maps and is therefore
suited to explore the impact of cultural differences
(operationalized in this way) on deliberative ar-
gument exchange process (a first attempt is made
in Banisch et al., forthcoming). This also allows
to link the model to recent empirical work on
the identification of different belief systems within
different social strata or sub-cultures (Baldassarri
and Goldberg, 2014; Daenekindt et al., 2017, see
also Converse (1964)) and the qualitative differ-
ences with respect to issue alignment in particular
(cf. Goldberg, 2011, Figure 7).
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of argument ex-
change dynamics that extends the »argument
communication theory of bi-polarization (ACTB)«
proposed in (Mäs and Flache, 2013, 2). Our
main contribution is to show that an argument
exchange account of social influence dynamics
can provide a useful framework for modeling pro-
cesses of issue alignment (Baldassarri and Gold-
berg, 2014; Dimock et al., 2014) by which atti-
tudes on a set of issues become correlated along
(ideological) dimensions. While the main focus
in recent model-based studies of polarization (e.g.
Dandekar et al., 2013; Friedkin, 2015; Mäs and
Bischofberger, 2015; Duggins, 2017; Banisch and
Olbrich, 2017) has been to explain the emergence
of a bi-polar opinion distribution on a single issue,
empirically motivated studies of polarization (e.g
DiMaggio et al., 1996; Baldassarri and Goldberg,
2014; Dimock et al., 2014) indicate that the align-
ment of attitudes across several issues is at least
an equally important signature of polarization. To
our knowledge this is the first modeling account
that addresses these inter-issue dependencies and
constraints in an explicit way.
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Figure 9: Overview over the model behavior in the different conditions described in Sec. 3.1. The
distribution of N = 1000 after 1000 iterations is shown with β = 1.
